USA Today's latest study released today on college coaches' compensation reveals that at least 25 college head football coaches are making $2 million or more this season, which is slightly more than double the number two years ago, and the average pay for a head coach in the 120-school Football Bowl Subdivision is up 28% in that time and up 46% in three years, to $1.36 million. Two weeks ago, the Knight Commission released its survey of bowl-subdivision university presidents in which 85% of the respondents said they felt football and basketball coaches' compensation "was excessive" as well as "a key contributor to the (fiscal) 'arms race' in intercollegiate athletics" and "the greatest impediment to sustainability."
With the end of the football season approaching and, hence, the beginning of the coach solicitation season, the timing is ripe to announce my new law review article on this subject titled, The Coaching Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics: Economic Implications and Legal Considerations. The paper will be published in the coming weeks in the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal and can be downloaded off SSRN here. I take an extensive look at the economics surrounding college coaches' contracts and the reasons for rising coaches' salaries, and then use the economics to tackle the legal question that everyone avoids like the plague, which is what can schools do about it?
From a legal standpoint, it is astonishing that schools routinely solicit and steal coaches who are under contract with another school and that these solicited coaches are free to breach their contracts with limited or no repercussion. This is not representative of free market competition, but rather unfair competition. It would be like the Cowboys soliciting Tom Brady to breach his contract with the Patriots, and even worse, the Patriots then allowing Brady to breach his contract with them. The professional leagues have "no tampering" rules that prohibit this tortious interference and the Patriots would have no qualms whatsoever about using judicial means to prevent Brady (via a negative injunction) from playing for the Cowboys. Indeed, the NFL even has a no tampering policy with respect to its coaches.
The NCAA should consider adopting a "no tampering" policy (i.e. an anti-solicitation rule) similar to the NFL's no tampering policy which essentially prohibits teams from soliciting coaches under contract. In my paper I also explain why schools are entitled to equitable relief in the form of a negative injunction to prevent their coaches from jumping ship, and there is even precedent for it specifically in the context of enforcing college coaches' contracts.
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