Saturday, January 15, 2011

Home-field advantage and the umpire analogy

An article by Tobias Moskowitz and L. Jon Wertheim in the new Sports Illustrated (I cannot find it on-line for some reason) examines the cause of home-field advantage in sports. If the study is empirically sound (and I want to down with some empiricists to help me figure out if it is), the results are groundbreaking. Moskowitz and Wertheim argue that home-field advantage is mostly explained by official bias, influenced by a combination of the closeness of the game and the game situation; the home crowd (size, loudness, proximity, and intensity); and limited attention to, or accountabiltiy for, particular decisions. Read the whole thing if you can get it (or it eventually comes on-line).

Briefly, officials conform their calls to social pressure created by the home crowd. Officials use crowd noise  to help them resolve uncertainty in making a call, resulting in more calls going the way the home crowd wants them to go. Studies done for or discussed in the the story showed a range of calls in a range of sports that systematically favor home teams--extra time, fouls, and yellow and red cards in soccer; called (non-swinging) balls and strikes in baseball; close plays on the bases in baseball; traveling in basketball; and penalties and fumbles in football. The psychological effect is more pronounced in well-attended games (according to the story, in 2007, the Italian government ordered teams with deficient security to play games without spectators; 21 games were played in empty stadiums and a study by two economists found dramatic decreases in home-team benefits in fouls, yellow cards, and red cards).

The bias is revealed, in part, by the rise of technology, particularly in football. Visiting teams are more successful in overturning calls favoring the home team, especially where the home team is trailing. In other words officials make mistakes in the home teams' favor more often than they do in visiting teams' favor (although the difference is small). Replay thus has resulted in the narrowing or elimination of the home-team advantage, at least as to turnovers, because some of those erroneous calls are corrected (so maybe I need to rethink my opposition to replay in football). Technology also reveals  that officials get it right most of the time (about 85 % on balls and strikes). But the mistakes they make are not random--they tend to favor the home teams. And, of course, most mistakes are not discoverable or reversible--thus the home-field advantage continues.


I am not sure what to do with the story, which I find fascinating. For starters, I wonder what this tells us about the much-despised umpire analogy. One of my objections has been that the analogy, as used, misrepresents what umpires do. This study supports that thought. Umpires clearly do not just call balls and strikes as a simple, clear, robotic exercise--umpires (and other officials) are human and they and their decisions are subject to outside pressures and influences, such as, essentially, public opinion.
Similarly, critics of the umpire analogy have focused on the outside influences that (everyone who is being honest recognizes) affect judicial decisionmaking--life experience, ideology, politics, empathy, public opinion and pressure--just as outside influences affect umpires. But is there a still more-precise comparison between judicial decisionmaking and officiating, given what this new study shows? Is there a litigation "home team" that systematically gets the benefit of judicial decisions? Perhaps the government (especially in criminal cases) or any other repeat player in litigation? Are judges affected by the (unconscious) need/desire to make the populace happy, just as umpires are similarly affected, and does that affect decisions?

What else can this study tell us about judicial decisionmaking?

You Can't Sit There! UVA's Ticket and Seating Policy for Men's Basketball Games Called into Question

Jeff Eisenberg of Yahoo! Sports has a great piece on a UNC hoops fan who bought a $100, 2nd row seat at a UNC-UVA game played in Charlottesville VA, but because he was wearing a Carolina blue coat and because the section was primarily intended for UVA fans and athletic staff, he was told he could not sit in the seat he purchased.

He was escorted out of the section -- which I imagine could have been embarrassing -- and dispatched to a different and not as good seat, where his school's colors were apparently less offensive.

Should he have been forced to change seats merely because he was supporting the opposing team? Even as a UVA alumn, I say no.

Here's an excerpt from Eisenberg's story:
* * *

Before the 46-year-old Arlington, Va. resident had time to remove his Carolina blue coat, a security guard approached and told Demery he couldn't sit in that section of John Paul Jones Arena wearing Tar Heels colors. Soon afterward, another Virginia staffer asked to see his ticket to verify that it was legitimate. And finally, associate athletic director Jason Bauman escorted Demery from his seat and relocated him to another seat 17 rows higher in the lower bowl.

"I couldn't believe it," Demery said. "I'm sitting there hoping to enjoy the game courtside and I thought it was going to work out great and in a matter of 15 minutes, it changed. I just was shaking my head thinking, 'How is this possible? How are they allowed to get away with this?'"

* * *

Michael McCann, director of the Sports Law Institute at Vermont Law School, said that Demery's contractual rights may have been breached if the ticket he purchased didn't stipulate that he could not sit in the seat unless he was a Virginia fan. McCann also said relocating Demery may have been a First Amendment violation since Virginia is a public school and has less authority to regulate speech than a private institution.

"A fan who wears the 'wrong' team's shirt should probably not be excluded from a particular seat that he has legally purchased," McCann wrote via e-mail. "Sure, schools can encourage fans of one team to sit in certain sections, but they probably can't sell a ticket and then revoke its conditions because the ticket-buyer happens to be a fan of the other team."

* * *
To read the rest, click here.

To expand my comments, while colleges clearly have "some" authority to regulate the conduct of fans and what's known as fans' "cheering speech" (i.e., how fans cheer, either for or against a team/player - a topic which Howard has written about), their use of that authority has to be carefully drafted. For instance, if fans excessively and loudly spew out profanities at games, and there are kids around, their First Amendment rights may be trumped by various concerns, including those based on security. Plus, those fans would likely have violated the terms of their ticket admission by being so disruptive.

But merely wearing the opposing team's colors? Come on. Hard to see how that can be regulated without providing notice to ticket buyers in advance.

It's disappointing that a school founded by Thomas Jefferson, of all people, would take this approach.

F.T.C. to Investigate Football Helmet Manufacturer Riddell

The Associated Press reported on Friday that the United States Federal Trade Commission is looking into potentially misleading and deceptive trade practices by football helmet manufacturer Riddell. Riddell is the official helmet manufacturer of the National Football League.

According to the AP article, the F.T.C. is concerned about statements on Riddell's website stating that "research shows a 31 percent reduction in the risk of concussion in players wearing a Riddell Revolution football helmet when compared to traditional helmets." According to United States Senator Tom Udall (New Mexico) -- who wrote to the F.T.C. requesting an investigation -- there is little evidence supporting Riddell's safety claims. For its part, Riddell released a statement calling the allegations "unfounded and unfair," and welcoming any scrutiny.

The AP interviewed Professor Stephen Ross, director of Penn State's Institute for Sports Law, Policy and Research, for its story, who noted that "the commission has several options if it decides to pursue action against companies, including a cease-and-desist order."

For more on this story, see the Associated Press's report here.

Friday, January 14, 2011

Show Myself The Money? NFL agent Bob LaMonte and Representing Both Sides of Cleveland Browns Negotiation

Is there a conflict of interest when the same NFL agent represents a team's president, executive VP, general manager and the person whom the team is hiring as coach?

Welcome to the world of the Cleveland Browns!

Bill Lubinger of the Cleveland Plain Dealer has the story and interviews several persons, including Rick and me:

* * *
The middle man in the Browns' 10-day coaching search was Bob LaMonte, whose influence in Berea now stretches from the team's boardroom to the coach's office.

The seasoned NFL agent represents the Browns' executive team of President Mike Holmgren, General Manager Tom Heckert and Executive Vice President Bryan Wiedmeier. He also represents Browns coach Pat Shurmur, who will be introduced today.

How is it that an agent can sit on both sides of the table without a conflict of interest?

* * *

NFL spokesman Greg Aiello said the players union regulates agents, not the league. And, according to union rules, dual representation is not prohibited as long as an agent discloses the names of any coaches, general managers or other management types he or she represents.

* * *
"My expectation," said Scott Rosner, associate director of the Wharton Sports Business Initiative at the University of Pennsylvania, "is that it would be an arm's-length negotiation."

* * *

Sports lawyer Rick Karcher, who directs the Center for Law and Sports at the Florida Coastal School of Law, said agents would suggest such representation is an advantage because it provides valuable connections, allows for insight other agents wouldn't have and allows them to serve as a helpful mediator when two clients clash.

* * *

Michael McCann, director of the Sports Law Institute at the Vermont Law School, said the remedy is just that simple.

"The fix is easy, at least in theory," McCann said. "Get a new agent."


To read the rest, click here.

Even More on Antitrust Law and the BCS

While Monday evening's BCS National Championship Game commanded much of the college football world's attention this week, the antitrust implications of the Bowl Championship Series continued to make news as well. Specifically, as reported by several media outlets, the law firm of Arent Fox -- legal counsel to Boise State University and the Mountain West Conference on matters relating to antitrust law and the BCS -- recently submitted a report to the United States Department of Justice arguing that the BCS violates federal antitrust law. The Justice Department is presently deciding whether to launch a formal antitrust investigation of the BCS.

The Arent Fox report sets out to debunk 22 common arguments advanced in support of the BCS, ranging from the assertion that a playoff would damage college football's regular season, to the issue of whether consumer welfare is sufficiently implicated by the BCS to warrant an antitrust lawsuit. The report concludes that the BCS does in fact violate antitrust law, and urges the Justice Department to launch a formal investigation.

To read the Arent Fox report click here. For other takes on the legality of the BCS under antitrust law, please see my article "Antitrust & The Bowl Championship Series," as well as Michael McCann's "Antitrust, Governance, and Postseason College Football."

Thursday, January 13, 2011

Could the Alleged Misdeeds of Internationally Based Boxers Put Them Down for the Count with U.S. Commissions?

Back in September, hot junior middleweight contender Alfredo (El Perro) Angulo, 19-1 (16 KOs), provided the boxing world with an explicit example of what it takes to be banned from United States boxing venues, United States television, and the United States as a whole. Angulo, then a favorite son of HBO Sports, was deported back to Mexico in September after it was discovered that he had illegally entered the United States, got deported back to Mexico, and illegally entered the United States for a second time over the course of several years. In one fell swoop, Angulo burned not only U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), but also HBO and his entire U.S. team. While Angulo may ultimately be able to salvage his career in his native Mexico, his situation begs the question of what it takes, other than a serious medical condition or an immigration infraction, for an internationally-born or based boxer to be banned from boxing in the United States. Angulo was an easy call, indeed the federal government did not even leave it to any athletic commissions’ discretion, but the legal and regulatory issues facing other notable boxers based outside of the United States today, who could otherwise be granted visas to fight and train over here, may not provide similarly clear outcomes. Indeed, boxers like the late Edwin (El Inca) Valero have been allowed to enter the United States only to be banned by specific commissions. Using New York law as a backdrop, an analysis of whether the recent legal and regulatory problems of several notable overseas boxers could result in their inability to be licensed in the United States follows...

For the complete article, please click on this link.

Polygraph = Anti-Corruption Tool?

Does the polygraph (aka lie detector machine) have to potential to be used as an anti-corruption tool in sports? According to a recent Guardian article by Andy Wilson and Rob Bagchi, the answer appears to be "yes." The plan was hatched after reports of match-fixing in the sport of cricket.

The news column caught my eye because I suggested something similar in a recent paper regarding possible bias by NBA referees. In relevant part, I wrote the following:

In the absence of collaboration in the form of direct evidence, the prima facie showing could be rebutted by an innocuous explanation. The analysis here merely lends itself to the formation of a rebuttable presumption. Without more, such analysis is uncorroborated. A subsequent investigation that includes personal interviews, polygraph tests, or the like would be necessary to conclusively ascertain whether any insidious conduct occurred.

Including such a "polygraph provision" in any league-union CBA would be unlikely, but may be an option if corruption ever reaches this level, as reported by Eric Pfanner of the New York Times in the context of European soccer.