The Give Blog

University of Illinois Law Professor Suja Thomas, who teaches sports law, and her husband Scott have created the Give Blog, where up until December 24th they will match donations of up to $100 from new donors to five charities (The Hunger Project, The Grameen Foundation, Safe Passage, Catcholic Charities USA, and Eastern Illinois Foodbank). If you're interested in contributing to any of these five charities during this holiday season, please consider doing so through the Give Blog, as Suja and Scott will match the amount if you are a new donor. For more information, click here.

2010 AALS Sports and the Law Section Meeting and Panel

For those of you attending the Association of American Law Schools' 2010 annual meeting in New Orleans in January, Villanova Law Professor David Caudill, the Chair of the AALS Section on Sports and the Law, invites you to attend this year's section meeting and panel, which will be held from 1:30 to 3:15 p.m in the Elmwood Room (3rd Floor) of the Hilton New Orleans Riverside.

Below are details on the section's events:

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THE TOPIC: THE NEW NFL/NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT: AVOIDING A CATASTROPHE?

OVERVIEW: When the NFL opted out of the current collective bargaining agreement with the NFLPA, the stage was set for contentious negotiations during the 2009 season and potentially beyond. A labor-related stoppage or lockout could result from a failure to come to terms. The topic for this year’s sports law panel will be the present state of labor negotiations within the NFL. The NFL owners will likely predict an economic crisis if the players make unreasonable demands in terms of percentage of revenue, salary cap, bonus provisions, and the rookie wage scale, while the players’ union will likely claim that the owners never had it so good. Perhaps the real Super Bowl for sports lawyers will take place around the bargaining table this year.

PROGRAM: To open the program, Professor Robert H. Topel, the Isidore Brown and Gladys J. Brown Professor in Urban and Labor Economics at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, will discuss his controversial study (co-authored with Chicago colleague Professor Kevin Murphy), on behalf of the NFLPA, of the economics of the NFL. What was the NFL’s response to the study? Has the recession altered any of the conclusions of that study?

Next, three law professors will address various aspects of the NFL/NFLPA labor controversy:

Professor Emeritus Bob Berry (Boston College): “Show Me the Money Revisited: The Current NFL Labor Conundrums”.

In the past, dating from the 1960s to the 1990s, NFL labor confrontations often concentrated on player mobility issues. The draft, free agency and free agent compensation were contentious issues, resulting in work stoppages on more than one occasion. This year is different, or seems to be. Pure economic issues appear to be largely the basis of the current negotiations. The question is, however, whether anything has really changed. Has it always been about the money? An even more basic issue is why at this time there is already talk of a lockout and a possible attempt at union decertification. While all these are brewing, we might as well revisit possible antitrust issues under the labor exemption.

Professor Matt Mitten (Marquette): “Drug testing and Sports Medicine Issues in NFL Collective Bargaining: A Proposed Quid Pro Quo.”

Specific issues to be discussed: (1) NFL clubs’ characterization of team physicians as “employees” in effort to bar players’ medical malpractice claims by the worker’s compensation co-employee doctrine; and (2) the 8th Circuit’s recent Williams v NFL decision, which permits the NFL’s collectively bargained drug testing policy to be challenged on the ground it violates Minnesota state law.

Professor Jeff Standen (Willamette): “American Needle and the Threat of Union Decertification”

This paper argues that the American Needle case currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court will impact heavily on the upcoming labor negotiations. If the NFL prevails in its argument that the league constitutes a "single entity" for all or certain legal purposes, then a chief NFLPA bargaining tactic, the threat of union decertification, would be unavailable. Decertifying the players union arguably strips the NFL's bargaining agent of its non-statutory labor exemption and exposes the league to antitrust liability. If the NFL, however, is characterized by the Supreme Court as a single entity, then the league would be effectively immune from antitrust claims. The paper suggests that the Court should adopt a nuanced perspective on the single entity theory in order to preserve the ability of the union to resort to judicial redress.

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It should be a great event and I look forward to attending.

The Free Agents and Important December Deadlines

Last week, 171 players filed for free agency by the November 19 deadline. Of that group, there are 23 Type A free agents and 49 Type B free agents. John Grabow, a Type A free agent, and the Chicago Cubs have already agreed to a new 2-year, $7,500,000 deal. Now the December 1 and December 7 deadlines are quickly approaching. The teams have until December 1 to offer arbitration to protect their right to receive compensation if the player accepts a deal with another team. The December 7 deadline is the last date that a player can agree to accept an offer of arbitration from his former team. If the arbitration agreement is offered and accepted, the team and player will either work out an agreement on salary or proceed into the arbitration process that can involve the exchange of figures and a hearing.

Two players, Darren Oliver and David Weathers, agreed to accept arbitration offers last year. Oliver is a Type A free agent this off-season. Weathers moved from the Reds to the Brewers during the season, and he is a Type B free agent this year.

Two more important December events are the Winter Meetings in Indianapolis from December 7-10, and the tender deadline of Saturday, December 12. As I mentioned in an earlier post, there is some thought that many arbitration-eligible players will not be tendered, thus, increasing the number of free agents on the market. Recently, Scott Boras questioned the financial situation in baseball and wondered about teams that maintain really low budgets in the face of the current revenue stream from the centrally shared resources. It could be a really interesting off-season.

Here is the list of Type A and Type B free agents:

Type A

Jason Bay (Boston - OF), Rafael Betancourt (Colorado - RP), Orlando Cabrera (Minnesota - SS), Johnny Damon (New York Yankees - OF), Octavio Dotel (Chicago White Sox - RP), Jermaine Dye (Chicago White Sox - OF), Chone Figgins (Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim - 3B), Mike Gonzalez (Atlanta - RP), John Grabow (Chicago Cubs - RP), Kevin Gregg (Chicago Cubs - RP), LaTroy Hawkins (Houston - RP), Matt Holliday (St. Louis - OF), Orlando Hudson (Los Angeles Dodgers - 2B), John Lackey (Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim - SP), Bengie Molina (San Francisco - C), Darren Oliver (Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim - RP), Placido Polanco (Detroit - 2B), Marco Scutaro (Toronto - 2B/SS), Rafael Soriano (Atlanta - RP), Miguel Tejada (Houston - SS), Jose Valverde (Houston - RP), Billy Wagner (Boston - RP), and Randy Wolf (Los Angeles Dodgers - SP).

Type B

Garret Anderson (Atlanta - OF), Rod Barajas (Toronto - C), Erik Bedard (Seattle - SP), Joe Beimel (Colorado - RP), Ron Belliard (Los Angeles Dodgers - 2B), Adrian Beltre (Seattle - 3B), Chad Bradford (Tampa Bay - RP), Doug Brocail (Houston - RP), Marlon Byrd (Texas - OF), Kiko Calero (Florida - RP), Michael Cameron (Milwaukee - OF), Doug Davis (Arizona - SP), Mark De Rosa (St. Louis - 3B), Carlos Delgado (New York Mets - 1B), Justin Duchscherer (Oakland - SP), Scott Eyre (Philadelphia - RP), Jon Garland (Los Angeles Dodgers - SP), Brian Giles (San Diego - OF), Troy Glaus (St. Louis - 3B), Vladimir Guerrero (Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim - OF/DH), Rich Harden (Chicago Cubs - SP), Bob Howry (San Francisco - RP), Nick Johnson (Florida - 1B), Randy Johnson (San Francisco - SP), Jason Kendall (Milwaukee - C), Adam LaRoche (Atlanta - 1B), Braden Looper (Milwaukee - RP), Felipe Lopez (Milwaukee - 2B/3B/SS/OF), Brandon Lyon (Detroit - RP), Jason Marquis (Colorado - SP), Melvin Mora (Baltimore - 3B), Guillermo Mota (Los Angeles Dodgers - RP), Xavier Nady (New York Yankees - OF), Will Ohman (Los Angeles Dodgers - RP), Miguel Olivo (Kansas City - C), Vicente Padilla (Los Angeles Dodgers - SP), Chan Ho Park (Philadelphia - SP), Carl Pavano (Minnesota - SP), Andy Pettitte (New York Yankees - SP), Joel Pineiro (St. Louis - SP), Fernando Rodney (Detroit - RP), Ivan Rodriguez (Texas - C), Brian Shouse (Tampa Bay - RP), Russ Springer (Tampa Bay - RP), Fernando Tatis (New York Mets - 1B/3B/OF), Yorvit Torrealba (Colorado - C), David Weathers (Milwaukee - RP), Randy Winn (San Francisco - OF), and Gregg Zaun (Tampa Bay - C).

Journalism Ethics Run Amuck, Once Again

The Associated Press published a story yesterday on a very tragic, sensitive and private matter involving the death of a famous professional athlete's mother. The report not only discusses details surrounding the death, but also personal information about the player's relationship with his mother.

The issue here is not whether the facts of this publication are untrue. The disclosure of private facts tort claim subjects the press to liability for the publication of truthful private matters that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that are not of legitimate public concern. In many respects, we as a society have become brainwashed into thinking that the press has a constitutional privilege to publish whatever truthful matters it wants, especially when the matter involves a public figure. But surprisingly, the Supreme Court has given very limited attention to the constitutional privilege of the press to publish truthful private facts and has addressed the issue in only one case involving a public disclosure of private facts tort claim (see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)), and its holding in that case was deliberately and explicitly narrow. Such little guidance by the Supreme Court naturally leaves state and federal courts wide discretion to determine what constitutes a "legitimate public concern" (a/k/a newsworthiness) and to balance the conflicting interests of individual privacy and press freedom.

As I discuss at length in my law review article Tort Law and Journalism Ethics, state and federal courts have proffered varying definitions of newsworthiness. The California Supreme Court in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) recognized that a broad "public domain" view of the First Amendment privilege, i.e. any information readily available to the public, would swallow the public disclosure of private facts claim. Regarding matters involving public figures, the court set forth what I believe is the proper standard for newsworthiness: "[T]he evaluation of newsworthiness depends on the degree of intrusion and the extent to which the plaintiff played an important role in public events, and thus on a comparison between the information revealed and the nature of the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public attention. Some reasonable proportion is . . . to be maintained between the events or activity that makes the individual a public figure and the private facts to which publicity is given."

In other words, there must be a nexus or connection between the private information published and the public activity that makes the person a public figure. Here is an excerpt from my law review article:

"The relevance/nexus factor is a critical component in balancing the First Amendment and journalism ethics standards because such an inquiry takes into account the purpose, or reason, for the publication of the matter. If there is a remote nexus or connection between the truthful matter and the event or activity that brought the plaintiff to public attention or that made him or her a public figure, then the societal First Amendment interest in the information is much less compelling because the purpose for publication becomes primarily one of sensational prying into private affairs for its own sake or one of pandering to lurid curiosity."

There is a very tenuous connection between the details surrounding the death of a player's mother and what makes the player a public figure, that being his status as a professional athlete. This publication, having no social value and intruding into an extremely tragic, private and sensitive personal matter, turns journalism ethics standards on its head.

Professor Alfred Yen on Efforts by Colleges to Discourage Disappointing High School Recruits from Enrolling

Over on Madisonian.net, Boston College Law School Professor Alfred Yen has a thought-provoking piece on Duke basketball recruit and high school senior Clair Watkins, who, as a junior, Duke University offered a full scholarship to play (and enroll) at Duke. Watkins, an honors student, has apparently not progressed as a player and Duke recently told her that while it will honor its scholarship offer, Watkins likely wouldn't play at Duke if she enrolled. Watkins is now contemplating other college options, though she could still choose to accept Duke's full scholarship, as she has until the spring to decide.

Here's an excerpt from Professor Yen's post:

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I find this story interesting and complicated. At first blush, it’s all about nasty Duke finding better players for its team and then dumping someone they had aggressively courted. That having been said, Duke apparently is willing to stick by its commitment to a 4 year scholarship if Ms. Watkins still wants to attend. Many schools would simply have withdrawn their scholarship offer, as verbal early commitments are explicitly non-binding.

So, on one hand, I find myself giving Duke respect for keeping its promise of a 4 year scholarship. Indeed, Ms. Watkins might have found herself on the bench anyway. If the Duke coach changed her mind about Ms. Watson because better players had committed to the program, or if other players outplayed Ms. Watson once she got to Duke, she’d have the same experience the Duke coach has now warned about.

On the other hand, I also think that Duke has revealed just how much it values winning basketball games over real decency. The truly decent thing to do would be for Duke to tell Ms. Watson that she needed to elevate her game in order to play, and that the coach was calling to express her commitment to helping Ms. Watson improve. To put this in perspective, should a college call an admitted student to say “We’ve reconsidered. You’ll probably be at the bottom of your class, so maybe you’d like to go elsewhere?” Or, should a college say “We know you will find our curriculum challenging. Here are all of the academic support services that will help you thrive.”? By calling with the cold shoulder, the Duke coach was hoping to get Ms. Watson to give up her scholarship despite Duke’s willingness to honor it. Apparently they didn’t really want her to come to the school unless she would be a star basketball player.

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To read the rest, click here.

Reebok files its Brief in American Needle v. NFL

This past Tuesday was the deadline for the respondents in American Needle v. NFL to file their briefs with the United States Supreme Court. Although the NFL's brief is not yet publicly available, the brief submitted by Reebok, the NFL's co-defendant in the case, is now available to be downloaded. Meanwhile, for those interested in getting a preview of the NFL's argument, both ESPN.com's Lester Munson and the SportsBusiness Journal's Liz Mullen have posted articles discussing the brief.

The earlier-filed briefs by the petitioner, American Needle, and its supporting amici are available here and here.

Commissioner as Justice or Executive? Thoughts on Zelinsky

Mike already mentioned Aaron Zelinsky's new essay (forthcoming in Yale Law Journal Online) arguing that the better baseball analogy is between Supreme Court justices and the baseball commissioner. Aaron sent me a draft of the paper and I made a few comments; he gave me permission to reprint them (in much expanded form) here.

For starters, the analogy does work in some respects. The commissioner (working, in part, with the owners) makes prospective rules of general applicability, umpires apply them in particular game settings, and the commissioner corrects their understanding of those rules when it believes the umps got it wrong.

The problem with this is that the Supreme Court makes prospective rules within the confines of review of lower court judgments through case-based decision-making. Not only does the Court establish a rule going forward, but it also dictates something about the outcome of a specific legal dispute. By contrast, the commissioner virtually never reverses a judgment (a particular ball/strike/safe out call) issued by an umpire; and he certainly virtually never reverses the sum-total of all umpire judgments, the result of a single game. The Pine Tar Game in 1984, which Aaron discusses in his paper, is one of the rare examples of this. Of course, that reversal was possible only because the umps' decision came on the very last play of the game; if it had happened in the 5th inning, the league might have had a harder time outright reversing the outcome.

Rather, it seems to me that the commissioner is better thought of as a legislator. Or better still, as the executive working together with the various teams/owners/GMs acting as the legislature. In most of the examples Aaron presents (the calling of balks, changing the strike zone, etc.), the commissioner has seen how umpires have been interpreting and applying the rules, not liked that approach, and changed the rules (or ordered a different interpretation) going forward. This very much how Congress (or Congress and the President) interact with the courts on matters of subconstitutional law--courts apply the rules in cases and, when Congress does not like the way the rules are being interpreted, understood, or applied, it changes the rules prospectively, to be applied by courts in future cases. In fact, the one thing Congress cannot do is dictate case-specific outcomes to courts; it can only set the rules

Put somewhat differently, the Supreme Court and the trial courts (who Aaron says are better comparable to umpires) are engaged in a version of the same enterprise--deciding discrete cases. The commissioner and the umpires are doing something very different from one another, just as the legislature and the courts are doing something very different from one another.

Of course, much depends on whether we see the strike zone (or the rules of the game more generally) as analogous to statutes or to the Constitution. If the strike zone is statutory, then commissioner-as-Congress makes sense, in terms of degree of control. If the strike zone is constitutional, then this does not work.

Moreover, Aaron's analogy potentially breaks down along a couple of points.

First is the difference between how the Commissioner makes legal rules to guide umpires on the ground and how the Supreme Court does. There is a difference between case-based, litigation-bound rulemaking that courts do and the more free-standing prospective rulemaking that the Commissioner engages in. Even if the Supreme Court is more concerned with rulemaking than error correction, it still makes its prospective rules rules only in the context of litigation and in the context of reviewing decisions by lower courts. While it can reach out to do a lot when it chooses, it does not have the type of free-standing rulemaking authority the commissioner has.

Second, the resulting rules are different. The "judicial minimalism" trend (espoused by C.J. Roberts and Justice O'Connor and scholars such as Cass Sunstein) affects the analogy. The Commissioner is not and arguably should not be "minimalist"--he goes around and makes the generally applicable prospective rules he believes necessary. A Justice committed to minimalism--and bound by case-based decisionmaking--will produce less far-reaching rules. And those minimalist rules arguably will be harder to apply in future cases because their contours are less clear and more in need of fleshing out by lower courts.

Third, the Commissioner is able to act unilaterally in the best interests of the game. Aaron's essay focuses heavily on the way commissioners (notably Bart Giamatti, but including others) have wielded individual power. An individual justice can do only what four other colleagues are willing to go along with; the resulting legal rules are affected by that deliberative group-based process (as a host of recent poli sci literature has demonstrated), usually by being narrower and less far-reaching. Now maybe this means that proper analogy is not Commissioner/Justice but Commissioner/Court. But we still have to account for the differences in how an individual act as opposed to how a collective acts.

Fourth, the commissioner's realm is such that he can, if he chooses, wade into a larger swath of potential areas and issues that affect how umpires call the games. The Supreme Court, even if it wanted to hear more than the ridiculous 75 cases it hears now, could not reasonably take on any substantial percentage of the cases or issues brought to the courts in a given year. At its peak, the Court in the 1970s would hear 150-200 cases per term, a tiny fraction of the cases brought in federal and state courts.

But that points up one last break in the analogy. Aaron's argument is systemic--trying to place everyone in comparable places within the system of baseball or the judiciary. But there is no rulemaking buffer between the commissioner and the umpires; the commissioner makes the rules and the policies, the umpires follow. But the Supreme Court is not even the primary rulemaker guiding the lower courts; that role is played by the courts of appeals, especially given the Supreme Court's small caseload. And if the commissioner is the Supreme Court and the umps are the trial courts, we need to find someone in MLB who is somehow analogous to these intermediate appellate courts that do make binding prospective rules, but in a far broader array of cases.